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Abstract
Despite the fact that the correlation between policy rates in the U.S. and in
the euro area has been low—at least over the past three decades—long term interest
rates in the two regions have been highly correlated. More recently (since the
early 1990s) their levels have also converged. Decomposing long-rates in their
underlying factors–real rates (plus an in ation risk premium), term premia,
expected monetary policy and expected in ation—we  nd that this convergence
re ects more similar economic structures in the U.S. and in the euro area, rather
than a change in the distribution of shocks that hit the two regions. As far as the
response to shocks is concerned, since the start of EMU Euro area long rates have
become more responsive to local non-monetary shocks: in the long run, however,
they converge to the same level of U.S. long rates because expected in ation
and expected monetary policy also converge to similar levels. Policy rates in
t h ee u r oa r e ah a v ea l s ob e c o m em o r er e s p o n s i v et ol o c a ln o n - m o n e t a r ys h o c k s .
Finally, since the start of EMU, a monetary tightening by the ECB raises long
rates, contrary to what used to happen in the 1990s when the Bundesbank was
running monetary policy. Interestingly long rates in the Euro area fall following
a monetary tightening in the U.S.
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tations, Monetary Policy
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11 The convergence of U.S. and euro area long rates
This paper is an investigation into the factors that determine long-term interest rates
in the euro area. We measure long rates in the euro area with the yield on 10-year
German benchmark government bonds: we thus abstract from credit and liquidity
spreads that vary both among euro bonds issued by di erent governments and between
corporate and sovereign bonds. We are interested in understanding to what extent–if
at all–and through which channels the transition to a monetary union has a ected
European long rates. In particular we are interested in understanding whether it has
a ected the comovement of U.S. and European yields. Why is this relevant? Because
long rates incorporate long-term in ation expectations and expectations on future
monetary policy: they thus provide a direct assessment of the credibility of a central
bank’s in ation target.
Our data on long rates (the frequency is monthly and the source is Datastream)
are shown in Figure . The sample extends over three decades: we divide it into
three sub-samples (the 1980s, the 1990s and the years following the start of EMU),
which correspond to distinct periods in the euro area: the EMS, its crisis in the
early nineties, followed by the transition to EMU, and the years since the creation
of EMU. Along with European rates Figure 1 also shows the evolution of U.S. long
rates: the 10-year benchmark U.S. Treasury. We note two facts: (i) the correlation
between European and U.S. yields has always been high ( in Figure 1 indicates
the coe cient of correlation between the two series), but the levels of the two yields,
which were di erent in the 1980s, have converged to the same unconditional mean
since the early 1990s; (ii) the high positive correlation between U.S. and European
long-term rates is not a feature shared by monetary policy rates (shown in Figure 2)
in any of the periods we have considered. This suggests that there are factors beyond
monetary policy that explain the correlation between euro area and U.S. long rates.
To understand which factors these might be it is useful to start by decomposing
10-year yields in two di erent ways:
•  rst, we split the nominal yield on a -year bond, , in the weighted sequence
of expected future policy rates–which we denoted with  
–and a term pre-
mium, , as shown in equation (1);
• alternatively, in equation (2), we split the nominal yield in the expected in ation
over the remaining life of the bond,  
, and the sum of the in ation risk
premium, 	 and the real rate,  both also measured over the remaining
life of the bond:
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Equation (1) applies the linearized expectations model of Shiller (1979). It is
derived from a no-arbitrage condition: expected one-period returns from holding a
long-term bond must be equal to the one-period risk-free interest rate, plus a one-
period term premium. For long term bonds bearing a coupon  the one-period
holding-return is a non-linear function of the yield to maturity  Shiller (1979)
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= +1 +  (3)
where  is the one-period holding return of a bond with maturity date , 	
is the information set available to agents at time , +1 is the short-term (one-
period) risk free interest rate, 
 is a constant of linearization which depends on the
maturity of the bond. (For a long-term bond such a constant can be approximated
by 1(1 + ¯ ),s i n c elim    
 = 
 =1 (1 + ¯ )).  is a term premium–de ned
over a one-period horizon–for holding for one period a bond with residual maturity
   Solving equation (3) forward we obtain (1) where  is the term premium
over the entire residual life of the bond.
Equation (2) decomposes the nominal long-term yield to maturity into an expected
in ation component, a real long-term interest rate and an in ation risk premium (see
for instance Blanchard and Summers, 1984 and Ang, Bekaert and Wei, 2007).
To carry out these decompositions we need forecasts of future policy rates and
future in ation. We construct them by estimating the following VAR:























 and y 	

 are measures of the output gap computed by applying the
Hodrick-Prescott  lter to the log of industrial production. The  lter is one-
sided and it is computed recursively in real time, that is the output gap at time
 uses only information available at time . y 	

 is obtained using German
industrial production up to 1998:12 and euro area industrial production from
1999:1 onward;
•  
 and   	

 are annual in ation rates (based on consumers prices).
  	

 is obtained by considering German data up to 1998:12 and the euro
area HCPI index from 1999:1 onward;
• the short term rates 
+1 	

+1 are the policy rates: the Federal Funds rate
for the U.S., the German policy rate up to 1999:1, and the euro area overnight
rates thereafter;
• the long-term rates 
+120 	

+120 are the yields to maturity on 10-year bench-
mark government bonds.
To construct forecasts of future policy rates and future in atio, we estimate a
sequence of VARs by rolling least squares using a window of ten years of observations.
The lag length of each estimated VAR is decided on the basis of standard optimal
lag-length selection criteria. The restriction A12 =0saves degrees of freedom by
applying the standard assumption that U.S. variables do not respond to euro area
variables.
Denoting with Z = AZ 1 + u the stacked representation of the sequence of
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 are computed using average long-term rates over the previous
120 observations and the 0
 ( =2 367) are column selection vectors with elements
equal to 1 in the  position, and equal to 0 anywhere else.
Figures 3&4, and 5&6 show the results of our two decompositions. We are unable
to identify separately the long real rate  from the in ation premium 	 in
equation (2), since we can only project future values of observed variables: thus, in
Figure 4, we report the sum of the two.






 with the break-even in ation rates
implicit in the yield on in ation-indexed bonds: 10-year U.S. TIPs and the French
10-year OATi (indexed to the French CPI) for the euro area. The comparison–over
the available sample–is reported in Figures 7&8. In both series expected in ation
is the average expected in ation over a ten-year period computed using the same
weights used to build long rates from a sequence of expected short rates. Break-even
in ation rates built from indexed bonds include, however, an in ation risk premium
that is not present in the series we construct. As Figure 7&8 show the measures of
expected in ation constructed using our VAR are close to breakeven in ation.
We now return to Figures 3 through 6. The main message from these  gures
is that the convergence in the levels of euro area and U.S. long rates, documented
in Figure 1 is mainly due to the convergence in expected in ation and in expected
monetary policy. Moire speci cally:
• convergence in the levels of nominal yields is mainly due to the convergence
5in the levels of expected monetary policy in the two areas (Figure 5): the
convergence in levels is paired with a clear increase in the correlation between
the two series that rises from a value of 0.17 in the  rst decade to values of .71
and .51 in the second and third decades;
• parallel to the convergence in expected monetary policy there has been a sharp
(though not complete) convergence in long-term expected in ation–though ex-
pected in ation remains slightly higher in the U.S. relative to the euro area.
(Figure 3);
• term premia fall, from the  rst to third decade, in both the U.S. and in the euro
area (Figure 6). Their correlation across the two regions also becomes smaller
(from 0.74 in the  rst decade to 0.16 in the most recent one). A lower level of
term premia and a lower correlation of term premia across regions–while the
correlation between long rates remains high–suggests that the importance of
term premia in explaining  uctuations in U.S. and German yields has declined
over time;
•  nally, convergence of nominal yields, but higher expected in ation in the U.S.
than in the euro area means that the sum of real long term yields plus the
in ation risk premium has become higher in the euro area compared with the
U.S.
An alternative way to investigate what determines the convergence of long rates in
t h et w or e g i o n si st oa n a l y z et h es t e a d ys t a t es o l u t i o n so ft h eV A R sw eh a v ee s t i m a t e d .
These are reported in Figure 9 and show the long run equilibrium values of long rates
and their components. (For each of the samples we dynamically simulate the three
estimated VARs starting from the initial conditions for all observable variables at the
beginning of the sample). The results suggest that the convergence in the levels of
long-term rates is explained by the fact that the equilibrium values of all components
have become more similar: real rates (plus the in ation risk premium), term premia,
expected monetary policy and expected in ation all appear to converge.
An interesting fact emerges from the lower panel of Figure 9: the convergence
between euro area and U.S. expected monetary policy and expected in ation was
already achieved in the early nineties: there is no di erence between the second and
third decades of our sample. This is not the case for term premia and real rates (plus
the in ation risk premium) for which convergence happens only in the EMU decade.
Thus, to the extent that one can detect a di erence between the last decade of the
61990s and the most recent one, this seems to depend on factors that are not directly
related to monetary policy.
2S h o c k s , o r s t r u c t u r e ?
Long rates have converged because expected monetary policy (and thus expected
in ation) has converged. But why did expected monetary policy converge? One
possibility is that the shocks that hit the two regions are increasingly correlated:
if this were the case it would not be surprising that expected monetary policies also
converge. An alternative is that the shocks keep being di erent (as the low correlation
of policy rates suggests) but long rates have converged because the structures of the
two economies, including importantly the objectives of the two central banks, have
become more similar.
To provide evidence on the relative importance of shocks and changes in economic
structure–the systematic components of the VARs–in determining the convergence
in the levels of long-term rates we run the following simple experiment.
• we  rst construct counterfactual long-rates post-1990. We do this simulating
(dynamically) a model constructed by augmenting the systematic part–the
VAR estimated over the post 1990 sample–with residuals drawn from their
empirical distribution estimated on the pre-1990 sample;
• we then run the reverse exercise. We construct counterfactual pre-1990 rates
(dynamically) simulating a model constructed by augmenting the systematic
part–the VAR estimated over the pre-1990 sample–with residuals drawn from
their empirical distribution estimated on the post-1990 sample. (Note that
this exercise uses the reduced form residuals: it is thus independent of any
assumption needed to identify structural shocks, except for the restriction A12 =
0.)
These counterfactual simulations are shown in Figure 10. The results strengthen
the evidence in favour of the hypothesis that the level of yields converged because
the structure of the U.S. and euro area economies converged, rather than the shocks
which hit them1. In the pre-1990 counterfactual, the levels of European and U.S.
yields–generated using the pre-1990 structure and the post-1990 shocks–remain
1Our exercise is similar to what Stock and Watson (2002) and Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2004)
have done to evaluate the "good policy" against "good luck" explanations of the Great Moderation.
Benati and Surico (2007) argue that the evidence that switching shocks across subperiods inverts the
7di erent. On the contrary, in post-1990 sample, the counterfactual the level of yields–
constructed using post-1990 structure and pre-1990 shocks–remain close to each
other.
2.1 Which elements of the "economic structure" have converged?
To address this question (remembering that "economic structure" includes the ob-
jectives of central banks) we study how the two long-rates respond to monetary, to
macroeconomic and to term premia shocks and whether these responses have changed
over time.
To do this we need  rst to identify such shocks: this requires additional identifying
assumptions beyond A21 =0 . We identify four  nancial shocks: two monetary policy
and two non-monetary policy shocks, respectively in the U.S. and in the euro area.
Monetary policy shocks are deviations from the systematic response of the two central
banks to macroeconomic variables. Non-monetary shocks–as we shall learn from
impulse responses–are shocks to term premia: thus from now on we shall refer to
them as "term premia shocks". We do not identify the shocks to the two macro
variables, in ation and the output gap: we just consider them as macro shocks.
We make the following identifying assumption on the contemporaneous relations
among the variables in the VAR: all macro variables react with at least a one-month
lag to  nancial variables. Financial variables react simultaneously to macroeconomic
developments. Monetary policy does not react to  nancial shocks in the month they
happen. The recursive structure between the U.S. and the euro area (A21 =0 )is
assumed to hold also for the simultaneous relation among shocks.
Imposing these identi cation assumptions on the relation  ² = u between the





















means restricting  to be a diagonal matrix (i.e. standardizing the shocks) and
imposing upon  the following restrictions 2
 nal outcome is not decisive: the volatility of estimated shocks could be a ected by the structure of
the economy. However, our result—namely that switching shocks does not invert the  nal outcome—
cannot be explained by the Benati and Surico (2007) argument.
2These assumptions are often used to identify U.S. monetary policy shocks (see, for example,
Christiano et al. 1999) and shocks to U.S. long-term rates (see Evans and Marshall, 1998 and
Edelberg and Marshall, 1996). The restrictions they imply satisfy the rank and order conditions for
identi cation discussed in Amisano and Giannini (1997).
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Table 1 summarizes the e ects of the structural shocks on euro area long rates
The entries in the table are the forecasting errors when we use our VAR to predict
long rates in the future. Our identi cation assumptions allow U.S. to decompose the
variance of these forecasting errors in six orthogonal components: monetary policy,
term premia and macro shocks (a combination of shocks to in ation and output gaps)
in the U.S. and in the euro area. We compute the variance of the forecasting errors
at two di erent horizons: one-month ahead and 120-months (ten years) ahead. The
exercise is repeated for three subsamples.
Table 1: Variance decomposition of European 10-year rates
U.S. shocks euro area shocks
sample macro MP TP macro MP TP
79-89 1-step 0.09 0.06 0.21 0.02 0.01 0.62
120-step 0.35 0.11 0.24 0.11 0.05 0.14
90-98 1-step 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.80
120-step 0.27 0.01 0.25 0.33 0.01 0.12
99-07 1-step 0.01 0.01 0.38 0.05 0.01 0.57
120-step 0.12 0.06 0.18 0.30 0.04 0.30
Two  ndings emerge from Table 1:
• the 1-month ahead forecasting error is always almost totally explained by a
combination of U.S. and euro area term premia shocks; the forecasting variance
of long rates attributable to monetary policy shocks is small, both at the short
and long (10 year) horizon. This is true in EMU as it was in the two previous
decades;
9• since the start of EMU the share of the forecasting variance (at the 10-year hori-
zon) attributable to euro area idiosyncratic macro and term premia shocks has
increased. In the 1999-2007 sample 60% (030+030)o ft h ev a r i a n c eo ft h ef o r e -
casting error at a 10-year horizon is attributable to local non-monetary policy
shocks; this share was 45% in the previous decade (033 + 012) . Thus, when
euro area long rates deviate from their systematic component (A()y 1 in
(??)) this is mainly because of shocks to the local and U.S. term premia and to
local macro variables.
To better understand the e ects of  nancial shocks on long rates in Figures 11-14
we analyze impulse responses. We report the responses of long-term rates and of their
components as generated by the two decompositions proposed in the  rst section of
the paper.
• The impact of U.S. monetary policy shocks is shown in Figures 11.1-11.2. The
response of euro area long-term rates changed signi cantly since the start of
EMU. Now a U.S. monetary tightening induces a fall in long rates in the euro
area: this was not the case in the two preceding decades. As far as U.S. variables
are concerned our evidence con rms recent results by Roush (2007) who  nds
that the expectations theory works well to explain the behavior of the U.S. term
structure, conditionally upon monetary policy shocks.
• The e ect of U.S. non-monetary policy  nancial shocks is analyzed in Figure
12.1-12.2. The impulse responses show that these are shocks to U.S. term premia
and real 10Y rates (plus an in ation term premium). These shocks have a
much stronger impact than U.S. monetary policy shocks on European long-
rates. They generate a signi cant response in all sub-samples, but the response
is consistently much stronger in the post 1990 period than in the pre-1990 period.
The response of European monetary policy to these shocks was much stronger
in the 1990-1998 period than it is the post 1999 period. As a consequence,
in the 1990-1998 period, the non monetary policy related components of long
rates react less to U.S. term premia shocks. This is consistent with decoupling
of term premia in the period 1990-98 reported in the dynamic simulation shown
in Figure 9.
• The e ect of euro area (German prior to 1999) monetary policy shocks is shown
in Figure 13. Here we note immediately that in the period 1990-98, when the
Bundesbank was conducting monetary policy, what we found in the U.S. case–
10namely the evidence in favour of the expectations theory conditional upon mon-
etary policy shocks–is not replicated in Europe (Germany): monetary policy
shocks have a signi cant negative e ect on term premia. Interestingly, a con-
tractionary monetary policy shock over the 1990-98 period induces a negative
response in nominal long-term rates, as the reduction in risk premia more than
compensates the increase in expected monetary policy rates. Real and nomi-
nal long-term rates move in di erent directions. Such a response is completely
overturned in the 1999-2007 period where a surprise monetary tightening moves
the long-rate upwards, as term premia, expected monetary policy and the real
long-term rates all move in the same direction.
• Finally, Figure 14 considers responses to euro area  nancial, non-monetary pol-
icy shocks. Once again, these shocks can be interpreted as shocks to term
premia and real rates, and are always paired by a vigorous response of mone-
tary policy, with the ECB being more aggressive than the Bundesbank. This
evidence, along with the  nding commented above on the response to U.S. term
premia shocks, suggests that the ECB has responded to local  nancial shocks
more than the Bundesbank used to.
3C o n c l u s i o n s
We have concentrated on two important facts emerging from the evolution of long
rates in the euro area and in the U.S. over the past three decades:
• the correlation between euro area and U.S. yields has always been high, but the
levels of the two yields, which were di erent in the 1980s, have converged to the
same unconditional mean since the early 1990s;
• the high positive correlation between U.S. and euro area long-term rates is
not a feature shared by monetary policy rates in any of the periods we have
considered.
Decomposing long-rates in their underlying factors–real rates (plus an in ation
risk premium), term premia, expected monetary policy and expected in ation—we
 nd that the convergence of long rates re ects more similar economic structures in
the U.S. and in the euro area, rather than a change in the distribution of shocks that
hit the two regions.
As far as the response to shocks is concerned, since the start of EMU euro area
long rates have become more responsive to local non-monetary shocks: in the long
11run, however, they converge to the same level of U.S. long rates because expected
in ation and expected monetary policy also converge to similar levels. Policy rates
in the euro area have also become more responsive to local non-monetary shocks.
Finally, since the start of EMU, a monetary tightening by the ECB raises long
rates, contrary to what used to happen in the 1990s when the Bundesbank was running
monetary policy. Interestingly long rates in the euro area fall following a monetary
tightening in the U.S.
Our evidence calls for a close study of the relative importance of monetary policy
and international asset price  uctuations in determining euro area macroeconomic
variables. If macro  uctuations in the euro area depend more on asset price  uc-
tuations than on shifts in the monetary policy rate, than the impact of policy on
macro  uctuations is likely to be limited. Our results thus suggest that the models
used for the design of euro area monetary policy should consider explicitly the e ects
asset price  uctuations and of their international comovements. This feature is cur-
rently absent from the main DSGE models used at the ECB–for example Smets and
Wouters (2004).
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Figure 2: U.S. and Bundesbank-ECB monetary policy rates
14Decomposing long rates into expected in ation and the sum of long real
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Figure 4: 10Y yields- 10Y expected in ation
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Figure 6: 10Y term premia
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Figure 8: VAR based 10Y Euro area expected in ation and break-even in ation in
10Y French OATi
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18Counter-factual simulations: pre-1990 structure with post 1990 shocks,
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Figure 14: Impulse responses to German-Euro term premia shocks
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